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TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP
BACK: A NEED FOR CHINA TO
FURTHER AMEND ITS 2013
TRADEMARK LAW IN ORDER TO
PREVENT TRADEMARK SQUATTING
INTRODUCTION
he People’s ;epubliQ oL !hina _9!hina8^ has *uiQHly
emerged as a leading force in the global economy.1 In 2010,
!hina surpassed Tapan to have the world’s seQond-largest econ-
omy behind only the United States.2 By 2031, economists predict
that !hina will surpass the 7nited :tates to beQo/e the world’s
largest economy.3With the LinanQial do/inanQe oL !hina’s upper
class, the continuing development of its middle class,4 and a
2016 population of approximately 1.3 billion people,5 it is no sur-
prise that 9dsciaty-seven percent of the U.S. companies surveyed
by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai said they
intend to inQrease the level oL invest/ent in !hinaZ Z Z Z86 In order
to Lully Qapitali`e on !hina’s /arHetplaQe, /any Qorporations
and individuals have realized the importance of filing for trade-
/arH registration in !hina, whiQh identiLies a produQt’s source
and establishes recognition between a product and a particular
1. See Paul Kossof, The New Chinese Trademark Law, 104 TRADEMARK
REP. 867, 867 (2014).
2. See Andrew Monahan, China Overtakes Japan as World’s No. 2 Econ-
omy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748703361904576142832741439402.
3. See Andrew Soergel, America’s Days Are Numbered as the World’s Top
Economy, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 28, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.us-
news.com/news/articles/2015-12-28/americas-days-are-numbered-as-the-
worlds-top-economy. In 2031, China is projected to have a gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) of $35.26 trillion USD, while the United States is expected to have
a GDP of $33.66 trillion USD. Id.
4. See Kossof, supra note 1.
5. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUSBUREAU, http://www.cen-
sus.gov/popclock/ (last visited May 25, 2017).
6. Alexandra Ho, Record Number of U.S. Companies Call China Top Bet,
Survey Shows, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2015-03-04/record-number-of-u-s-companies-call-
china-top-bet-survey-shows. The survey, which included responses from 377
companies, shows a slight increase from the 2014 survey, where 65 percent of
U.S. companies indicated a strong desire to increase investment efforts in
China. See id.
T
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corporation or individual.7 Trademarks play a vital role for for-
eign corporations and individuals trying to establish themselves
in today’s global eQono/y,8 as trademarks allow a company or
individual to distinguish their product and reputation from oth-
ers in a crowded marketplace.9 The importance of trademarks
has especially increased due to the prominence of advertising to
consumers.10 For eleven straight years, China has received the
most trademark applications in the world.11 In 2013 alone,
China had 13.24 million trademark applications.12 Given these
statistiQs, it is apparent that !hina has beQo/e a 9trade/arH
powerhouseZ813
Many corporations and individuals, however, have been pre-
cluded from receiving sufficient trademark protection in the Chi-
nese marketplace by notorious trademark squatters.14 A trade-
/arH s*uatter is 9a person or Qo/pany that aQ*uires trade[
marks, not in the hopes of actually using them to help market a
product or service, but rather, in the hopes of making trademark
infringement claims against other persons or companies that do
7. See Kossof, supra note 1.
8. See Paolo Beconcini, China: The Role of Trademark Opposition in the
Protection of Brands in China in Light of the New Trademark Law, MONDAQ
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/350820/Trade-
mark/The+Role+Of+Trademark+Opposition+In+The+Protec-
tion+Of+Brands+In.
9. See Abigail Rubinstein, 7 Reasons Why Trademarks Are Important to
Your Business, ENTREPRENEUR (July 24, 2014), https://www.entrepre-
neur.com/article/235887.
10. See Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of
Trademark Law: The Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transna-
tional Trademark Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 309 (2000).
11. See Hank Leung & Ai-Leen Lim, ‘Professional’ TM Squatters in China,
LEXOLOGY (May 5, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=b89acc4f-b101-4cec-898b-adbf5fdcc017.
12. See Zhang Mao, China’s New Trademark Law, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG. MAG., no. 5, Oct. 2014, at 34. The number of applications received in 2013
is a dramatic increase from 2005 and 2006, when the Chinese Trademark Of-
fice received 664,017 and 766,000 trademark applications respectively. Robert
H. Hu, International Legal Protection of Trademarks in China, 13 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 69, 71 (2009).
13. SeeMao, supra note 12.
14. See Sophie Brown, BrandWars: Battling China’s Trademark ‘Squatters,’
CNN (July 17, 2014, 10:30 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/asia/china-trademark-squatters-pen-
folds/.
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use the/ to /arHet their produQts or serviQesZ815 Trademark
squatting is a global issue that has become an increasing con-
cern over the years.16 Since 2007, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative17 has expressed concern over the insufficient im-
paQt that !hina’s Trade/arH Law has on deterring trade/arH
squatters.18 As a result of trademark squatters, foreign corpora-
tions and individuals have lost billions of dollars in both sales
and jobs,19 including in 2009 alone, when U.S. corporations lost
an estimated $48 billion USD.20 These lost sales demonstrate
how trademark squatters interrupt the flow of global commerce
as a whole, as they prevent individuals and corporations from
capitalizing in foreign marketplaces.21
Examples of trademark squatting victims include Hermès,
who filed a trademark in China without registering its Chinese
translation, Ai Ma Shi.22Hermès, however, continuously used Ai
Ma Shi as its Chinese name with the QharaQters 9爱马8 in
15. Donald J. Smythe, Clearing the Clouds on the CISG’S Warranty of Title,
36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 509, 515 (2016).
16. See id.
17. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) advises the presi-
dent of the United States on matters pertaining to U.S. international relations
and trade. See Mission of the USTR, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr (last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
18. See William M. Leahy & Stephen Kho, Is China’s Amended Trademark
Law a Law with Teeth, or a Paper Tiger?, BOAO REV., Apr. 2015, at 106,
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/3/5/v2/35819/Is-China-s-
Amended-Trademark-Law-a-Law-with-Teeth-or-a-Paper.pdf.
19. See Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Trademark Squatting, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 252,
257N58 (2013). As stated by the U.S. Secretary of State, Carlos Guttierez, 9the
theft of IP in China was costing U.S. businesses an estimated $ 2.3 billion a
year. . . .8 Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in
China, but an Understanding of China’s Culture Will: A Lesson the United
States Has to Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 325, 327 n.8 (2011).
20. Of the $48 billion USD lost by U.S. corporations, $36.6 billion USD
comes from lost potential sales, while $11.6 billion USD comes from lost royalty
and license payments. See David Butcher,What Chinese IP Violations Cost the
U.S., INDUSTRY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://news.thom-
asnet.com/imt/2011/08/02/what-chinese-intellectual-property-violations-cost-
american-businesses-economy.
21. See Smythe, supra note 15.
22. See Ann Yan, China: Hermes and Chivas—The Disadvantages of Not
Being the First to File Applications for Trade Marks in China, MONDAQ (Apr.
2, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/x/170806/Trademark/Her-
mes+and+Chivas+The+Disadvantages+of+Not+Being.
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China.23 Thereafter, in 1995, a menswear company registered
the Chinese translation of Hermès using the almost identical
characters 9爱玛仕,8 whiQh also /eans #i Ma :hi in !hineseZ24
After battling for years to regain rights in its name, the Chinese
courts ultimately ruled against Hermès, finding that Hermès
failed to prove that it was a well-known brand in China prior to
the registration of its Chinese translation.25 Another victim of
trademark squatting includes pharmaceutical corporation,
Pfizer, who was prevented from receiving adequate protection
for the name of its popular drug, Viagra, when Guangzhou Via-
/en Phar/aQeutiQal !o/pany _93ia/en8^ registered the !hi[
nese translation for Viagra, Weige (伟 哥).26 The Supreme Peo-
ple’s !ourt in !hina ulti/ately denied PLi`er’s Linal appeal to
invalidate the registration, agreeing with previous rulings that
Pfizer was not a well-Hnown brand in !hina prior to 3ia/en’s
registration.27 Hermès and Pfizer are not alone in their battles
against Chinese trademark squatters, as corporations like
Nike,28 Apple,29 and Ferrari,30 and individuals like Justin
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Daniel Chow, Lessons from Pfizer’s Disputes Over its Viagra Trade-
mark in China, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 82, 82N83, 95N96 (2012).
27. See id. at 91.
28. In 2005, Nike attempted to register 9LeBron James8 in Chinese charac-
ters, only to find that a trademark squatter had already registered the name.
Laura Wen-yu Young, Understanding Michael Jordan v. Qiaodan: Historical
Anomaly or Systemic Failure to Protect Chinese Consumers?, 106 TRADEMARK
REP. 883, 894 (2016). After a ten-year battle, China’s Supreme People’s Court
ruled in favor of Nike and invalidated the squatter’s mark. Id.
29. Apple registered the mark 9iPhone8 in China in 2002. See Lydia Bel-
anger, Apple Loses Trademark Battle, Allowing Chinese Company to Use the
‘IPHONE’ Name, ENTREPRENEUR (May 3, 2016), https://www.entrepre-
neur.com/article/275080. In 2007, however, Xintong Tiandi began using the
mark on various products and registered for a trademark. See id. Subse-
quently, Apple unsuccessfully pursued legal action against Xintong in 2012.
See id.
30. A Chinese court granted a Chinese department store the right to regis-
ter Ferrari’s prancing horse design because Ferrari failed to establish that its
mark was well-known in China prior to the department store’s registration.
See Jing Luo & Shubha Ghosh, Protection and Enforcement of Well-Known
Mark Rights in China: History, Theory and Future, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 119, 141N50 (2009).
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Bieber31 and the Kardashians32 have all experienced this issue
in China.
#Lter dra/atiQ inQreases in !hina’s trademark applications,33
years of criticism and calls for reform from the United States and
other countries,34 and a meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Com-
mission on Commerce and Trade,35 where both countries agreed
to implement measures against bad-faith trademark registra-
tions,36 China made amendments to its Trademark Law, which
took effect on May 1, 2014.37 Wirst, #rtiQle @ oL !hina’s EXFD
Trademark Law directly aims to restrict bad-faith trademark
appliQations by stating that 9dtche prinQiple oL good Laith shall be
upheld in the application for trademark registration and in the
use oL trade/arHsZ838 The meaning of good faith and how it is to
be determined, however, remains unclear.39 Article 7 has al-
ready shown signs of hindering trademark squatting, as seen
31. See Brown, supra note 14.
32. The Kardashians are precluded from selling their fashion and beauty
products in China due to trademark squatters registering their last name in
the country. See David Pierson, Trademark Squatting in China Doesn’t Sit
Well with U.S. Retailers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2012/mar/28/business/la-fi-china-trademark-squatting-
20120328.
33. See Celia Y. Li & Tai Guo, Policies, Changes and Responses—Discussion
on the Third Amendment of China’s Trademark Law, CHINA IP, http://ipr.chi-
nadaily.com.cn/2013-11/15/content_17108832.htm (last visited May 25, 2017).
34. See David Hoffman, China’s Trademark Law May Not Go Far Enough,
L.A. DAILY J. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://dlhpatent.com/articles/chinas-trademark-
law-may-not-go-far-enough.pdf.
35. The U.S.KChina Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 9is an an-
nual dialogue that addresses commercial and trade issues between the US and
China.8 U.S.—China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), U.S.
DEP’T COM., https://www.commerce.gov/tags/us-china-joint-commission-com-
merce-and-trade-jcct (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
36. See Leahy & Kho, supra note 18.
37. See Mao, supra note 12. See generally Kossof, supra note 1, at 868 (dis-
cussing the process leading up to the enactment of China’s 2013 trademark
amendments).
38. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Aug. 30, 2013, ef-
fective May 1, 2014), art. 7, http://www.wipo.int/wi-
polex/en/text.jsp?file_id=341321 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter PRC
Trademark Law of 2013].
39. See Matthew D. Asbell & Dongfang Maggie Wang, Ten Key Considera-
tions on Chinese New Trademark Law, LADAS&PARRY (Oct. 8, 2014), http://la-
das.com/education-center/ten-key-considerations-chinese-new-trademark-
law/; Kossof, supra note 1, at 885.
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through the cases of U.S. menswear designer Michael Bastian,
which precluded a trademark squatter with 120 unrelated trade-
/arHs Lro/ registering "astian’s na/e,40 and former NBA
player Michael Jordan, which similarly prevented a trademark
squatter from using MiQhael Tordan’s last na/e in !hinese on
sports equipment.41 #rtiQle DB oL !hina’s EXFD Trade/arH Law,
unlike Article 7, has an indirect and negative impact on curtail-
ing trademark squatting by granting trademark squatting vic-
tims an initial appeal of a trade/arH appliQation to !hina’s
Trademark Office (CTMO),42 while allowing further appeals to
!hina’s Trade/arH ;eview and #dJudiQation "oard _T;#"^43
only after the trademark has been registered.44 This creates an
entirely new invalidation process where an alleged trademark
squatter is granted legal rights in the trademark before comple-
tion of the appeals process.45
Despite the positive rulings against trademark squatters in
the Michael Bastian and Michael Jordan cases, the Chinese
amendments have not gone far enough to fully protect trade-
mark rights of foreign corporations and individuals.46 !hina’s
40. SeeMatthewDresden,Not so Fast, Fashionistas: China Trademark Reg-
istration is Still Required, CHINA L. BLOG (July 17, 2015), http://www.chi-
nalawblog.com/2015/07/not-so-fast-fashionistas-china-trademark-registra-
tion-is-still-required.html.
41. See Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese Court Likes Mike in Mandarin Characters,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2016, at B7.
42. See Key Issues Regarding the Third Amendment to PRC Trademark
Law, UBILLA & CIA (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.ub-co.com/country/china/key-
issues-regarding-the-third-amendment-to-prc-trademark-law/.
43. The TRAB is responsible for resolving litigation that arises involving
trademark applications in accordance with China’s Trademark Law. See Rules
for Trademark Review and Adjudication, ST. ADMIN. INDUSTRY & COM. CHINA
(Sept. 17, 2002), http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjeng-
lish/flfg1_1/flfg/201012/t20101227_103089.html.
44. See PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 35. While a trade-
mark may also be opposed based on nonuse, this option is only available if a
trademark squatter cannot prove use of the mark within the past three years.
See Xiang Gao, An In-Depth Look at the New China Trademark Law, MONDAQ
(June 20, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/322032/Trademark/An+In-
Depth+Look+At+The+New+China+Trademark+Law).
45. See Sunny Chang, Combating Trademark Squatting in China: New De-
velopments in Chinese Trademark Law and Suggestions for the Future, 34 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 337, 353 (2014).
46. See Yue Fei, Trademark Piracy—A Problem that Persists in China,
SMITHS IP (June 14, 2016), http://www.smithsip.com/trademark-piracy-a-prob-
lem-that-persists-in-china/.
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failure to provide any definition or guidance for what constitutes
good faith registration of a trademark not only leaves foreign
corporations and individuals vulnerable to unclear, inconsistent,
and bias decision-making from Chinese officials who may favor
Chinese nationals47 but may also cause them to think twice be-
fore investing time or capital into filing for a trademark in
China. This makes Article 35 especially troublesome, given that
trademark squatters are free to assert legal rights in the trade-
mark or hold it as ransom before foreign corporations and indi-
viduals are able to fully utilize the appeals process.48 These is-
sues cannot be adequately resolved by simply implementing the
Qo//only suggested 9Lile-Lirst8 solution, whiQh Qalls Lor Loreign
corporations and individuals to file for registration at an earlier
point, even if business is not being conducted in China,49 as it
assumes that all foreign corporations and individuals have the
economic ability to engage in such a practice.50 Instead, to ade-
quately protect foreign corporations and individuals in Chinese
courts, Article 7 should be clarified to eliminate some of the dis-
cretionary power afforded to Chinese officials51 by adopting the
deLinition and eaa/ples oL bad Laith Lro/ #ustralia’s Trade
Mark Amendment Act (TMMA). Moreover, Article 35 should be
repealed and replaQed by #rtiQle DD oL !hina’s EXXF Trade/arH
47. See Asbell & Wang, supra note 39.
48. See Ashley Benjamin, Will New Chinese Law Help in Battle Against
Trade Mark Squatters?, DEHNS, http://www.dehns.com/site/information/indus-
try_news_and_articles/chinese_law_battle_against_trademark_squat-
ters.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
49. See Patrick Soon, Trademark Squatting in China: What Every American
Business Should Know, INSIDE COUNS. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.insidecoun-
sel.com/2014/09/04/trademark-squatting-in-china-what-every-american-b;
Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick, Trade Mark Squatters in China, LEXOLOGY
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0621eb51-
9e53-46ab-b3f5-8897c6dee719; Scott Baldwin, Don’t Sit and Wait: Stopping
Trademark Squatters, 4 INVENTORS EYE, no. 1, 2013,
https://www.uspto.gov/custom-page/inventors-eye-don-t-sit-and-wait-stop-
ping-trademark-squatters; Trademark Hijacking in China: The Importance of
Trademark Registration, REVOMARK (July 3, 2013),
http://www.revomark.co.uk/trademark-hijacking-in-china-the-importance-of-
trademark-registration/.
50. See Brown, supra note 14.
51. See INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TRADEMARK
LAW REVISION COMMENTS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Docu-
ments/January252013.pdf [hereinafter INTA COMMENTS].
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Law, which suspended the grant of trademarks until the conclu-
sion of the appeals process.52 China should also increase rights
for foreign corporations and individuals during the appeals pro-
cess by not only granting them the right to review trademark
s*uatters’ argu/ents and responses to the opposition53 but also
by granting automatic dismissal of the trademark if the trade-
mark squatter fails to respond to a claim of bad faith.54
This Rote will eaplore the progress /ade in !hina’s enLorQe[
ment of trademark rights against trademark squatters, while
calling for further reform to provide clarity, consistency, and
equal protection for foreign corporations and individuals trying
to assert trademark rights in China. Part I of this Note will de-
fine and describe the trademark squatter problem and provide
possible explanations for its persistence today, including the
high value placed on Chinese trademarks due to its large con-
sumer base,55 the lack of international trademark knowledge by
foreign corporations and individuals,56 and !hina’s Lirst-to-file
system, which grants a trademark to whoever files the applica-
tion Lirst, without needing prooL oL the trade/arH’s use in Qo/[
merce.57 This Part will also provide suggestions from scholars
and lawyers to avoid falling victim to trademark squatting, in-
cluding filing for trademark registration at the earliest point
possible,58 utili`ing !hina’s /ultiQlass registration syste/,
which enables foreign corporations and individuals to protect
52. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Oct. 27, 2001), art.
33, http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjeng-
lish/flfg1_1/flfg/201012/t20101227_103092.html [hereinafter PRC Trademark
Law of 2001]; see also INTACOMMENTS, supra note 51.
53. See INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, PRC TRADEMARK LAW REVISION
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS COMMENTS (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.inta.org/PDF%20Library/INTA%20Comments%20on%202013%20
China%20Implementing%20Regulations.pdf [hereinafter PRC IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS COMMENTS].
54. See id.
55. See Foreign Fashion Designer Prevails Against Trademark Squatter De-
spite Failing to Prove Prior Use, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (July 20, 2015),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Daily/detail.aspx?g=3cdbaceb-62f9-
4bd9-8b01-11592c3932b3.
56. See Soon, supra note 49.
57. See Chow, supra note 26, at 93.
58. See Soon, supra note 49; Fitzpatrick, supra note 49; Baldwin, supra note
49; Trademark Hijacking in China: The Importance of Trademark Registra-
tion, supra note 49.
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various goods under the same mark with one trademark appli-
cation,59 pursuing litigation,60 and entering the Chinese market-
place with an entirely new mark.61 Part II will discuss the his-
tory and develop/ent oL !hina’s Trade/arH Law by detailing
when it initially took effect, what rights it offered for trademark
registrations, and the scope of its protections. This Part will con-
tinue by de/onstrating !hina’s Qo//it/ent to proteQting intel[
lectual property (IP) rights through its adoption of international
trademark agreements and amendments to its own Trademark
Law. Part III will then discuss the amendments to China’s EXFD
Trademark Law that have had a positive and negative impact
on trademark squatting by imposing a good faith principle, ra-
ther than a rule, against trademark applicants and agencies,62
enforcing monetary penalties for violating this principle,63 and
restructuring the application and appeals process itself to not
only protect various goods with one trademark application64 but
also grant legal rights in the trademark to a squatter before the
appeals process concludes.65 While this Part will highlight the
positive impact of these amendments through the Michael Bas-
tian and Michael Jordan cases, it will also describe why further
a/end/ents are needed to QlariLy the good Laith prinQiple’s a/[
biguity and the appeal proQess’ Lavoritis/ toward trade/arH
squatters over foreign corporations and individuals. In calling
for these amendments, this Part will conclude by dispelling the
Qo//only suggested, yet oversi/pliLied 9Lile-Lirst8 solutionZ Wi[
nally, Part IV will outline recommendations for future changes
to !hina’s Trade/arH Law by desQribing #ustralia’s deLinition
and examples for bad-faith registration of a trademark, while
detailing how China can grant more rights to foreign corpora-
tions and individuals during the appeals process to even the
playing field when challenging trademark squatters in Chinese
courts.
59. See Chang, supra note 45, at 352.
60. See Yan, supra note 22.
61. See Maria Dam Jensen, New Hope for Trademark Owners in China,
AWAPATENT IP BLOG (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.awaipblog.com/tag/trade-
mark-squatters/; see also Brown, supra note 14.
62. See PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, arts. 7, 19.
63. See id. arts. 63, 68.
64. See id. art. 22.
65. See id. art. 35.
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I. CHINA’S TRADEMARK SQUATTER PROBLEM
This Part will describe how and why a trademark squatter
rushes to file Chinese translations of trademark registrations by
detailing the economic benefits produced by holding the power
to sell rights in the mark back to foreign companies and individ-
uals, without ever needing to exert time or effort into establish-
ing reputation in the mark. It will also articulate the negative
consequences for trademark squatting victims that leave them
vulnerable to trademark infringement liability and losing prod-
ucts associated with the trademark. Finally, knowing that trade-
mark squatters exist, reasons are provided for their persistence,
including the high economic value of a Chinese trademark, a
lack of international trademark registration knowledge by cor-
porations and individuals, a lack of enforcement of trademark
rights by !hinese oLLiQials, and !hina’s own Lirst-to-file system.
A. Trademark Squatting Defined
A trademark squatter is an individual who 9steals another’s
mark and registers it as a trademark in his countr[y] knowing
that it belongs to so/eone elseZ866 Trademark squatters are often
connected to the trademark field itself, as they work as trade-
mark agents and utilize their business and legal knowledge to
gain an advantage against foreign corporations and individu-
als.67 Trademark squatters not only target large corporations
but also small- and medium-sized corporations as well.68 Beyond
corporations, individuals are also susceptible to trademark
squatters.69 The types of trademarks that squatters attack also
varies. For example, some trademark squatters seek to register
trademarks once a brand owner has already established notori-
ety in the mark, as they can economically benefit without need-
66. Sangsuvan, supra note 19, at 259.
67. See Leung & Lim, supra note 11.
68. SeeHelika Jurgenson, Bad Faith Trade Registrations in China, YOURIP
INSIDER (June 27, 2016), http://www.youripinsider.eu/bad-faith-trade-mark-
registrations-china/.
69. See AJ Park, Trade Mark Squatter Dealt to in China Under New Trade-
mark Laws, LEXOLOGY (July 16, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=51f85d88-c543-4a42-9454-ab1032b31d9c; Wee, supra note 41.
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ing to exert time into establishing a reputation in the trade-
mark.70 Others register trademarks that have not yet entered
the Chinese marketplace, but may successfully do so in the fore-
seeable future, as they can capitalize early on the potential fu-
ture success that a trademark may have.71
The main reasons for trademark squatting are the legal enti-
tlements and bargaining power that it creates over foreign cor-
porations and individuals. First, trademark squatters have the
legal power to assert claims of trademark infringement against
foreign corporations and individuals who try to use their mark.72
Moreover, trademark squatters may cause foreign corporations
and individuals to have their goods associated with the trade-
mark seized.73 Trademark squatters are also afforded significant
bargaining power over foreign corporations and individuals be-
cause they are able to use the trademark as a bargaining chip in
exchange for money to sell the trademark back to its rightful
owner.74
B. Why Trademark Squatting Persists
Given these legal entitlements and bargaining power, it is no
surprise that trademark squatters continue to plague foreign
corporations and individuals today. One explanation for the
prevalence of trademark squatting in China is that Chinese
trademarks are uniquely valuable to squatters,75 given that
!hina’s /arHetplaQe grants aQQess to a large Qonsu/er popula[
tion consisting of roughly 1.3 billion people.76 Moreover, many
foreign corporations and individuals have a lack of international
trademark knowledge,77 making them unaware that they need
to file for trademark registration outside of their own country
under the prinQiple oL territoriality, whiQh states that 9a trade[
mark has a separate existence in each sovereign territory where
70. See Bradley Sova, Double-Double Trademark Trouble: In-N-Out and
Caliburger’s International Burger Brawl, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 53, 75
(2012).
71. See id.
72. See Sangsuvan, supra note 19, at 259.
73. See Breann M. Hill, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in
China: Is There a Lasting Solution?, 34 DAYTON L. REV. 281, 288 (2009).
74. See Sangsuvan, supra note 19, at 259.
75. See Foreign Fashion Designer Prevails Against Trademark Squatter De-
spite Failing to Prove Prior Use, supra note 55.
76. See U.S. and World Population Clock, supra note 5.
77. See Soon, supra note 49.
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it is registered (or otherwise legally reQogni`ed^Z878 This was ev-
ident through a United States Patent and Trademark Office79
study, whiQh Lound that 9only FB- oL #/eriQan s/all business
with a presence overseas were aware that a U.S. trademark only
receives protection within the United :tatesZ880
Beyond these external factors, Chinese officials and its trade-
mark system itself can explain why the trademark squatter
problem persists.81 First, Chinese officials fail to consistently en-
force its trademark law against squatters.82 Factors including
9loQalis/, a laQH oL LinanQial resourQes Z Z Z dandc loQal oLLiQials,
[who] . . . often profit from counterfeit goods through kickbacks
and bribes,883 all help to eaplain the law’s laQH oL enLorQe/entZ
Even when Chinese officials actually enforce the trademark law,
however, it is based upon a first-to-file system that further per-
petuates trademark squatting by granting trademark rights to
the first party who files the trademark application,84 without re-
quiring evidence of its use in commerce.85 This system enables
trademark squatters, who have no true interest in the mark it-
self, to steal a mark from a foreign corporation or individual in
78. James E. Darnton, The Coming of Age of the Global Trademark: The
Effect of TRIPS on the Well-Known Marks Exception to the Principle of Terri-
toriality, 20 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 11, 12 (2011).
79. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which was
established in F>BE, ai/s 9to pro/ote the progress oL sQienQe and the useLul
arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their re-
speQtive disQoveries Lor a Qertain period oL ti/eZ8 Patent and Trademark Office,
FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/patent-and-trademark-of-
fice (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). Through its function of registering trademarks,
the USPTO helps companies protect their brand and assists consumers in iden-
tifying the source of the products in which they are investing. See id.
80. Soon, supra note 49.
81. See Sova, supra note 70.
82. See Chang, supra note 45, at 354.
83. Id.
84. See Chow, supra note 26, at 93.
85. Id. Canada, through Bill C-31, Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1
_9"ill !-DF8^, also Lollows !hina’s Lirst-to-file system. Bill C-31 eliminates the
use requirement for trademark registration, despite similar concerns that the
bill will allow trademark squatters to prevail. See Robert D. McDonald, Major
!hanges to !anada’s Trademark Laws—What Every Business Needs to Know,
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=c27e3759-b28d-4564-ae2e-1f0e60fb08c4.
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order to benefit economically from the reputation already estab-
lished in the mark.86 Trademark squatters are able to flourish
under this system because the squatters are not required to in-
vest time or money in the mark prior to filing for registration.87
This leaves foreign corporations and individuals who have estab-
lished popular and successful marks outside of China vulnerable
to interference inside China.88 This differs from the approach
adopted in countries such as the United States, which follow the
first-to-use system.89Rather than focusing on the individual who
files for registration first, a first-to-use system requires themark
owner to use the trademark in commerce before an application
is accepted for registration.90
C. Can Trademark Squatters Be Defeated?
Since trademark squatting continues to persist in China, law-
yers and academics have recommended two proactive steps that
foreign corporations and individuals can take to prevent trade-
mark squatters from obtaining registration of their trademarks
in China.91 The most common recommendation for foreign cor-
porations and individuals is to Lollow the 9Lile-Lirst8 solution by
filing for registration before the trademark squatter, even if they
are not yet conducting business in China.92 In conjunction with
filing trademark registrations early, foreign corporations and in-
dividuals can prevent trademark squatters from registering
their marks for different products by utilizing Article 22 of
!hina’s EXFD Trade/arH Law, whiQh Qreates a /ultiQlass appli[
cation system.93 A multiclass application system enables foreign
corporations and individuals to indicate the various products
and services that they wish to associate with their trademark in
86. See Melanie Lee & Lee Chyen Yee, China’s Trademark System Baffles
Foreign Firms, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2012, 8:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/uk-china-trademark-idUSLNE81G02520120217.
87. See Smythe, supra note 15, at 516.
88. See Chang, supra note 45, at 346.
89. See id. at 345.
90. See Scott A. McKenzie, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual
Property Rights: A Comparison of Infringement and Remedies Available in
China Versus the European Union, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 529, 560 (1998).
91. See Yan, supra note 22.
92. See Chow, supra note 26, at 94N95; Soon, supra note 49; Fitzpatrick,
supra note 49; Baldwin, supra note 49; Trademark Hijacking in China: The
Importance of Trademark Registration, supra note 49.
93. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 22.
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a single trademark registration application.94 This recommenda-
tion, however, is oversimplified, as it requires foreign corpora-
tions and individuals to predict what types of products or ser-
vices the trademark squatter will try to register the trademark
under.95
If these two preventive measures are not taken, foreign corpo-
rations and individuals may try to defeat trademark squatters
by engaging in litigation.96 This course of action, however, often
leads to high litigation costs, lengthy delays in reaching a deci-
sion, and missed economic opportunities to benefit from the
mark.97 Pursuing lengthy litigation is especially risky in China,
as victory in a Chinese court can be difficult for foreign challeng-
ers because Chinese officials may be biased in favor of their own
nationals.98 This causes many foreign corporations and individ-
uals, suQh as #pple, to pay the s*uatters’ /onetary de/andsZ99
Alternatively, foreign corporations and individual may choose to
rebrand and enter the Chinese marketplace with an entirely
new mark to avoid the issue altogether.100
94. See Chang, supra note 45, at 352. When filing for a trademark registra-
tion application, the trademark applicant must specify the good or service that
they wish to associate the trademark with. See id. at 346N47. Services and
goods are divided into classes, where services are classified based on the 9na-
ture of the services performed,8 and goods are classified according to function
or material composition. Id.
95. See Yan, supra note 22; see also Chow, supra note 26, at 96.
96. See Yan, supra note 22.
97. See Soon, supra note 49.
98. See id. Pfizer’s unsuccessful battle to protect the Chinese name for Vi-
agra lasted eleven years. See Pierson, supra note 32.
99. Apple paid $60 million USD to the China unit of Proview International
Holdings Ltd. for the right to the iPad trademark. Loretta Chao, Jessica E.
Vascellaro, & Paul Sonne, Apple Pays Small Price in China Case, WALL ST. J.
(July 2, 2012, 2:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702304211804577501681233676036.
100. See Jensen, supra note 61; see also Brown, supra note 14. Li Daozhi filed
a trademark in China for Castel, a French wine, prior to Castel entering the
Chinese marketplace. See Jeffrey C. P. Wang & Trevor Roberts, Trademark
Squatting 101, 57 ORANGE CTY. LAW. 30, 32 (2015). Daozhi offered to sell the
mark to Castel for one million euros. Id. Castel refused to comply with the
demand and was sued by Daozhi, who won 33.73 million yuan (roughly $5.5
million USD). Id.While Castel appealed the decision, it nonetheless rebranded
with a new Chinese name in case it receives an unfavorable outcome. Id. 3.1
Phillip Lim also chose to alter its logo in order to not be precluded from enter-
ing the Chinese marketplace by a trademark squatter. See China’s Trademark
Turnaround Offers Hope for Brands Fighting ‘Squatters,’ JINGDAILY (July 12,
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II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW IN CHINA
To fully understand the trademark squatter problem in China,
a brieL eaa/ination oL !hina’s historiQal treat/ent of trade-
marks and involvement in international trademark agreements
is neQessaryZ This Part will begin by disQussing !hina’s early
trademark history, describing when trademark rights were first
acknowledged and what they protected, when these protections
ceased, and when China formally introduced its own Trademark
Law. It will also discuss the international trademark agree-
ments to which China is a signatory, including the Paris Con-
vention Lor the ProteQtion oL Undustrial Property _9Paris !onven[
tion8^, theMadrid Agreement Concerning the International Reg-
istration oLMarHs _9Madrid #gree/ent8^, and the #gree/ent on
Trade-;elated #speQts oL UntelleQtual Property ;ights _9T;UP:
#gree/ent8^, and desQribe how these agree/ents have not only
shaped !hina’s Trademark Law but also demonstrated its com-
mitment to protect and enforce IP rights.
!hina’s Lirst Hnown atte/pt to reQogni`e UP rights oQQurred in
35 CE, when Emperor Wenzong of the Tang dynasty issued an
ediQt that 9prohibited the unauthori`ed reproduQtion by persons
of calendars, almanacs, and related items that might be used for
prognostiQationZ8101 !hina’s LoQus on trade/arHs speQiLiQally be[
gan during the Northern Zhou Dynasty in 556N580 CE, when
the Chinese began attributing words to specific products.102 Le-
gally, China began recognizing trademarks during the Qing
Dynasty in 1904, when its first Trademark Law was passedK
the Interim Trademark Registration Regulation.103 At this early
stage, the trademark law had no impact on protecting trade-
mark rights, as officials did not punish violators of the law.104
2015), https://jingdaily.com/chinas-trademark-turnaround-offers-hope-for-
brands-fighting-squatters/.
101. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INCHINESECIVILIZATION 13 (1995).
102. Chinese merchants initially began trademarking their products to pro-
tect the craftsmanship behind their work. See Jessica Jong Zhou, Trademark
Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J.
415, 417 (2002). An early example of this is fine china, which was branded
using the mark 9Jingdezhen.8 Id.
103. See id. at 418; see also JIANQIANGNIE&KEISUKE IIDA, THEENFORCEMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INCHINA 179 (2006).
104. See Chang, supra note 45, at 341. The promulgation of China’s Interim
Trademark Registration Regulation came as the Qing Dynasty was perishing,
creating an inability for leaders during that time to effectively implement the
1008 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2
Any efforts made toward protecting IP rights, however, came to
an oLLiQial and sudden standstill during the rise oL the People’s
Republic of China.105 From 1966 to 1976, any laws geared toward
protecting IP rights were repealed due to the Cultural Revolu-
tion,106 causing fear and uncertainty amongst trademark owners
with respect to their ability to assert and defend their trade-
marks.107
In the 1980s, China began to desire more foreign investors, as
they were seen as vital to the Qountry’s eQono/iQ develop/entZ108
This led to reLor/ulating !hina’s legal syste/ to e/phasi`e pro[
tections for trademarks.109 On August 23, 1982, the foundation
Lor !hina’s present trademark law was established in the Trade-
mark Law of China,110when China started protecting trademark
rights for corporations and individuals by allowing for trade-
mark registrations.111 Allowing for trademark registrations was
signiLiQant beQause it 9proteQted the exclusive right of a trade-
mark owner to use a registered mark and authorized a private
right oL aQtion against aQts oL inLringe/entZ8112 While this law
went a long way toward/oderni`ing !hina’s proteQtion oL trade[
mark rights, it still had deficiencies, including the failure to pro-
vide punishment beyond compensatory damages as a deter-
rent.113
Simultaneous to acknowledging the deficiencies in its Trade-
mark Law, China conformed to the viewpoint of the interna-
tional community, which recognized the integral role that IP
plays in facilitating trade amongst nations and in boosting the
global economy.114 Due to the increased demand for trade, the
regulations against violators. See DEMING CHEN, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND RULE
RECONSTRUCTION 355 (2014).
105. See Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face
in Protecting Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
937, 940N41 (2006).
106. See NIE& IIDA, supra note 103, at 180.
107. SeeWong, supra note 105, at 941.
108. See Chang, supra note 45, at 342.
109. See id.
110. See Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384018.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016).
111. See Zhou, supra note 102, at 426.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See Li & Guo, supra note 33.
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need for a system of universalized trademark laws became nec-
essary to allow trademarks to properly function in the global
economy.115 International treaties adequately accomplish this
necessary harmonization by reducing the differences in the
trademark standards amongst signatory countries,116 while also
providing 9eLLiQienQy, Qlarity, dandc prediQtability8117 in their en-
forcement. This caused China to join the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)118 and become a signatory to the
following international agreements: the Paris Convention,119 the
Madrid Agreement,120 and the TRIPS Agreement.121 The Paris
Convention seeks to protect trademarks and other intellectual
property rights by promoting the enforcement of individual
rights in various countries.122 Similarly, the Madrid Agreement
enables a trademark applicant to protect a single mark within
multiple countries, so long as those countries are also signatories
to the agreement.123 Finally, the TRIPS Agreement creates min-
imum standards that each Member State must uphold, provides
115. See Blakely, supra note 10, at 310.
116. See Li & Guo, supra note 33.
117. Blakely, supra note 10, at 312.
118. The WIPO is an agency consisting of over 180 member countries dedi-
cated to spreading global awareness and protecting intellectual property
rights. See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (June 24, 2008), https://www.britannica.com/topic/World-Intellec-
tual-Property-Organization. The WIPO promotes IP rights through IP treaties
and monitoring compliance with any intellectual property agreements. See id.
119. See Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Di-
rections, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L& COMP. L.J. 431, 434 (1996).
120. China became a signatory to the Madrid Agreement on July 4, 1989. See
Madrid (Marks) Notification No. 41 Madrid Agreement Concerning the Inter-
national Registration of Marks, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/madrid-gp/treaty_ma-
drid_gp_41.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
121. See Other IP Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/par-
ties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
122. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/ (last visited Oct.
1, 2016).
123. See Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the Interna-
tional Registration of Marks, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/madrid_protocol/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2016).
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enforcement of IP rights through the creation of domestic proce-
dures and remedies, and subjects disagreements between Mem-
ber States to dispute-settlement procedures.124
With !hina’s adoption oL these international agree/ents, it
needed to assure that its Trademark Law complied with the ob-
ligations under each agreement, specifically the requirement to
adopt measures enforcing IP rights.125 Accordingly, China first
amended its trademark law on February 22, 1993.126 These
a/end/ents ai/ed to 9i/prove 6the ad/inistration oL trade[
/arHs’ and enQourage 6produQers to guarantee the *uality oL
their goods and maintain the reputation of their trademarks,
with a view to protecting consumer interests and to promoting
the development of [the] socialist commodity economy.’8127 First,
the a/end/ents outlined what Qonstitutes 9inLringe/ent,8
whiQh inQludes 9the sale oL goods that one is 6Lully aware’ are
counterfeits of a registered mark, the forgery or unauthorized
/anuLaQturing oL representations oL another’s registered trade[
mark, and the sale of trademark representations that were
Lorged or /anuLaQtured without authori`ationZ8128 It also in-
creased the amount of administrative fines that could be levied
against infringers.129
Despite these positive changes, China needed additional
amendments to further comply with its TRIPS Agreement and
Paris Convention obligations.130 This led to a second series of
amendments to its Trademark Law on October 27, 2001.131
Among other changes, these amendments included expanding
the protectable subject matter for trademarks, protecting well-
known marks, creating judicial review for trademark disputes,
124. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2016).
125. See Jayanth S. Swamidass & Paul M. Swamidass, The Trajectory of
China’s Trademark Systems Leading Up to the New Trademark Law Taking
Effect in May 2014, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF. SOC’Y 56, 62 (2014).
126. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 110.
127. Zhou, supra note 102, at 427.
128. Id.
129. See id.; see also Swamidass & Swamidass, supra note 125, at 62.
130. See Swamidass & Swamidass, supra note 125, at 63.
131. See id.; see also Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra
note 110.
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extending the timeframe for filing a trademark dispute against
an alleged infringer, and allowing for statutory damages.132
III. CHINA’S 2013 AMENDMENTS AND THENEED FOR FURTHER
IMPROVEMENTS
fespite the a/end/ents to !hina’s Trade/arH Law and its
adoption of international trademark agreements, IP-infringing
activities continue to plague China.133 Following a dramatic in-
crease in Chinese trademark applicants134 and years of criticism
and calls for change from the United States and other countries,
China further amended its Trademark Law in 2013.135 This Part
will describe the amendments that have positively impacted
trade/arH s*uatting, inQluding #rtiQle @ and F>’s good Laith
prinQiple Lor trade/arH appliQants and agenQies, #rtiQle EE’s
multiclass application system, and Article 63 and A?’s allow[
ances for damages against trademark squatters. This Part will
also discuss the negative impact of Article 35, which creates an
invalidation procedure when appealing trademark applications
by trademark squatters.136 This Part will continue by specifying
the positive i/paQt that #rtiQle @’s good Laith prinQiple has al[
ready had on defeating trademark squatters, as seen in Michael
"astian and MiQhael Tordan’s QasesZ Moreover, this Part will
acknowledge that the meaning of good faith under Article 7
needs to be further clarified, while Article 35 needs to be
amended to create a fair appeals process for foreign corporations
and individuals. Finally, this Part will explain why these
changes are necessary, even though many scholars and lawyers
argue that the 9Lile-Lirst8 solution is suLLiQientZ
A. How !hina’s 2>31 Amendments Impact Trademark
Squatters
!hina’s EXFD Trade/arH Law tooH eLLeQt on May F, EXFCZ137
These amendments are considered to be the most monumental
and i/paQtLul Qhanges to !hina’s trademark law since 1982.138
132. See Swamidass & Swamidass, supra note 125, at 63.
133. See id.
134. See Li & Guo, supra note 33.
135. See Hoffman, supra note 34.
136. See Chang, supra note 45, at 352N54.
137. SeeMao, supra note 12.
138. See The New Trademark Law Showcases China’s Determination to Fight
Against the Increasing Bad-Faith Filings, GEVERS (Jan. 9, 2014),
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While the trademark squatter problem continues to exist in
!hina today, the EXFD a/end/ents show !hina’s dediQation to[
ward creating a trademark system that targets bad faith trade-
mark squatters.139
The most critical amendment aimed at curtailing the trade-
/arH s*uatter proble/ is #rtiQle @, whiQh states that 9the prin[
ciple of good faith shall be upheld in the application for trade-
/arH registration and in the use oL trade/arHsZ8140 This amend-
ment can be used by foreign corporations and individuals to pro-
tect an unregistered trademark by contesting a trademark
s*uatter’s appliQation to register the/arHZ141 It may also be used
to prevent the CTMO from considering future trademark appli-
cations made by the squatter.142 Through Article 19, this good
faith principle is extended beyond the trademark squatters
themselves and may also apply to trademark agencies.143 This
expands the scope of protection afforded to foreign corporations
and individuals by targeting both trademark squatters and the
agencies that assist them in filing for registration of the mark.144
This ultimately decreases the legal resources available to trade-
mark squatters to carry out their illegal schemes.
Moreover, Articles 7 and 19 are reinforced by Articles 63 and
68 respectively, which serve as economic deterrents against
trademark squatters and trademark agencies who act in bad
faith.145 Article 63 affords Chinese courts discretion to award pu-
nitive damages ranging from 500,000 to 3 million RMB, (roughly
$80,000 to $500,000 USD) based on a finding of bad faith.146 Chi-
nese courts can also multiply the damages by up to three times
http://www.gevers.eu/en/news/2014-01-09/new-trademark-law-showcases-
china-s-determination-fight-against-increasing-bad-faith.
139. See Chang, supra note 45, at 350N51.
140. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 7.
141. See Cynthia S. Wang, China: Unregistered Rights in a First to File En-
vironment, WORLD TRADEMARK REV., http://www.worldtrademarkre-
view.com/Magazine/Issue/54/Country-correspondents/Unregistered-rights-in-
a-first-to-file-environment (last visited Oct. 14, 2016); see also Chang, supra
note 45, at 353.
142. See 8 Key Revisions to Chinese Trademark Law: Promising Steps To-
ward IP Protection, LATHAM & WATKINS (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-chinese-trademark-law-revisions.
143. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 19.
144. Id.
145. Id. arts. 63, 68.
146. 8 Key Revisions to Chinese Trademark Law: Promising Steps Toward IP
Protection, supra note 142.
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the allowed amount where bad faith is proven.147 Corporations
and individuals who successfully defend their trademarks in
China are also entitled to repayment of all expenses related to
defending their mark.148 When determining the amount of dam-
ages that a trademark squatter must pay, the burden of proof
shifts to the trademark squatter, who must produce requested
documentation and accounting books for the Chinese judge to
assess damages.149 With respect to trademark agencies, how-
ever, Article 68, limits the potential liability to civil damages
with no possibility for punitive damages.150
Furthermore, the amendments not only create a good faith
principle under which trademark applications must be filed but
also alter the application process itself to deter trademark squat-
ting.151 Under Article 22, foreign corporations and individuals
can designate one trademark application to protect the mark for
multiple types of goods.152 This not only broadens the protection
that one trademark application has for foreign corporations and
individuals but also makes trademark squatting more difficult,
as foreign corporations and individuals do not have to pay mul-
tiple application fees in order to prevent trademark squatters
from simply finding a popular trademark and registering it on
an unrelated product.153
Article 35 also alters the application process, however, its ef-
fects ultimately perpetuate trademark squatting.154 For exam-
ple, Article 35 grants foreign corporations and individuals the
ability to appeal a trademark application after an initial loss be-
fore the CTMO.155 While an appeal is still possible through the
TRAB, a certificate of trademark registration will be granted to
the trademark squatter, giving the squatter legal entitlement
over the mark before the conclusion of the appeals process.156
This empowers and emboldens trademark squatters to hold
trademarks for expensive ransoms from foreign corporations
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Chang, supra note 45, at 353.
150. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 68.
151. See Chang, supra note 45, at 352.
152. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 22; see also Chang,
supra note 45, at 352.
153. See Chang, supra note 45, at 352.
154. See id. at 353.
155. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 35.
156. See id.
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and individuals to regain legal rights in their marks.157 One pos-
sible justification offered for the enactment of Article 35 is that
it reduces the backlog of pending trademark applications before
the TRAB by registering the trademark at an earlier point.158
Proponents also allege that Article 35 decreases the number of
allegedly frivolous trademark application challenges by foreign
corporations and individuals.159 Theoretically, these frivolous
lawsuits create a heavy workload that cannot be successfully
maintained by trademark examiners.160 Article 35 is thus in-
tended to deter foreign corporations and individuals from mak-
ing frivolous challenges because it forces these parties to assess
the financial risk of opposing a trademark registration.161
B. Positive Aspects of the 2013 Amendments
!hina’s EXFD a/end/ents were widely antiQipated and Qele[
brated by those in the trademark community for their potential
to influence the trademark squatter issue.162 For example, in its
Special 301 Report,163 the WIPO identiLied !hina’s a/end/ents
as positive steps toward the promotion of intellectual property
rights internationally.164 3arious aspeQts oL !hina’s a/end[
ments have lived up to these expectations. One positive feature
of the 2013 amendments are that they establish the good faith
requirement as a principle, not a rule.165 A rule establishes a
157. See Chiang Ling Li & Haifeng Huang, China’s New Trademark Law,
JONES DAY (Oct. 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/7f2e3b1a-
5cce-40bd-b8a2-e0b37e686c2d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8bfa47aa-
c24b-45c7-ad16-e0d2d4ec31f5/China%20New%20Trademark%20Law.pdf.
158. See Chang, supra note 45, at 353.
159. See Beconcini, supra note 8.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Kossof, supra note 1, at 867N68.
163. The Special 301 Report is required according to section 182 of the Trade
Act of 1974. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2016 SPECIAL 301
REPORT (2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-
Report.pdf. It is produced by the USTR, who thoroughly examines how each
U.S. trading partner implements policies to enforce IP rights. See id. A country
will be given priority status if its IP policies fail to adequately protect U.S.
products. See id.
164. See id. at 7.
165. See New China Trade Mark Law, ROUSE (July 16, 2014),
http://www.rouse.com/magazine/articles/alerts/new-china-trade-mark-law/.
All other countries that recognize good faith in their trademark laws have
aligned with these benefits and concerns by utilizing principles instead of rules
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clear boundary for what will constitute permissible conduct.166
While a rule would provide trademark squatters, companies,
and individuals with a clear understanding of how to behave, a
rule would also encourage trademark squatters to push the
boundaries and come as close to violating the rule as possible
without any punishment.167 A standard, however, allows for
greater flexibility by describing permissible and forbidden con-
duct in broader terms, allowing judges to carefully analyze each
case on an individualized basis.168 This may cause trademark
squatters to be more cautious, as the line between good and bad
faith registrations is less clear.169
Moreover, in the year since the amendments took effect in
China, there is evidence that trademark squatting is on the de-
cline.170 The positive progress achieved through the good faith
prinQiple Qan be seen /ost notably in MiQhael "astian’s QaseZ171
Michael Bastian, a U.S. menswear designer, was precluded from
entering the Chinese marketplace by a Chinese company that
registered his English name and its equivalent Chinese transla-
tion.172 In 2015, the designer appealed the trademark decision
and brought a lawsuit before the Chinese TRAB, defeating the
trademark squatter based on the principle of good faith.173 The
TRAB found that Bastian established bad faith of the Chinese
trademark squatter, who previously attempted to register 120
/arHs _unrelated to "astian’s^ without any Hnown QonneQtion to
those marks.174 In reaching its decision, the TRAB held that Bas-
tian sufficiently established bad faith and did not require proof
that the mark was well-known in China prior to the Chinese
to guide its enforcement. See generally ELIZABETH HOULIHAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, BAD FAITH TRADE MARK FILINGSKAN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (2013), http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/badfaith-
filings.pdf.
166. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384
(1985).
167. See id. at 384N85.
168. See id. at 385.
169. See id.
170. See Wang Yadong & Lu Lei, China Supreme People’s Court Gives Clear
Legal Prescription for Trademark Squatting, NIUYIE,
http://www.niuyie.com/china-supreme-peoples-court-gives-clear-legal-pre-
scription-for-trademark-squatting/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
171. See Park, supra note 69.
172. See Jensen, supra note 61.
173. See Park, supra note 69.
174. See Dresden, supra note 40.
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company filing for registration of the mark.175 While the good
faith principle has previously been applied to Chinese nation-
als,176 the Michael Bastian case is significant because it marked
the first instance where the principle was successfully applied in
Lavor oL a Loreign Qo/pany’s opposition Lor registrationZ177
Another example of !hina’s progress toward Qurtailing trade[
/arH s*uatting Qan be seen through MiQhael Tordan’s QaseZ178
Tordan’s legal battle began in EXFE, when<iaodan :ports, a !hi[
nese sports Qo/pany, registered the trade/arH 9<iaodan,8
which is the Chinese translation of Jordan.179 With the inclusion
oL Tordan’s na/e on its produQts, <iaodan :ports thrived, as the
business sold around $500million USD in goods in 2015 alone.180
Tordan Qhallenged <iaodan’s registration nu/erous ti/es but
failed to overturn the lower court rulings in favor of Qiaodan,
which found insufficient evidence definitively linking Jordan to
the mark, reasoning that 9Tordan8 is a Qo//on na/e that Qan
refer to anyone.181 <iaodan’s /arH, however, was ulti/ately in[
validated by the :upre/e People’s !ourt in EXFA, whiQh granted
175. See Michael Bastian Wins Landmark Trademark Decision in China,
CHINA IP (July 10, 2015), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/news-
show.asp?id=7907.
176. The good faith principle was successfully argued by former national bas-
ketball association (NBA) player and Chinese national, Yao Ming, who blocked
a trademark squatter from using his name on feminine sanitary products. See
The NBA and Its Continuing Trademark Battles, CHINA IPR (July 10, 2012),
https://chinaipr.com/2012/07/10/the-nba-and-its-continuing-trademark-bat-
tles/; see also Mark Allen Cohen, Trademark Squatting in China Doesn’t Sit
Well with U.S. Retailers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2012/mar/28/business/la-fi-china-trademark-squatting-
20120328.
177. See Dresden, supra note 40.
178. SeeWee, supra note 41.
179. Qiaodan Sports also registered Jordan’s NBA jersey number 23 and the
image of Jordan jumping with a basketball in his hand. See Eben Blake, Mi-
chael Jordan Loses China Trademark Lawsuit to Chinese Knockoff Brand Qi-
aodan Sports, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 30, 2015, 1:09 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/michael-jordan-loses-china-trademark-lawsuit-chi-
nese-knockoff-brand-qiaodan-sports-2032080.
180. Amy Hsiao & Christopher Shen, How Michael Jordan Won TM Case in
China Without TM Rights, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/876507/how-michael-jordan-won-tm-case-in-
china-without-tm-rights.
181. Qiaodan successfully defended its use of the Jordan trademark in two
court rulings as well as in the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, where the
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Jordan the rights to the Chinese translation of his name.182 Jor-
dan was able to establish bad faith against Qiaodan Sports by
showing recognition of his name in China dating back to 1984,
well beLore <iaodan’s EXFE registrationZ183 Jordan further estab-
lished <iaodan’s bad Laith through its uneaplainable registra[
tion of other marks associated with his name, including his
Ju/p/an silhouette, Jersey nu/ber, and sons’ na/esZ184 Based
on this evidenQe, the Qourt ulti/ately reasoned that 9<iaodan
:ports Z Z Z 6/aliQiously’ registered trade/arHs Lor the use oL Tor[
dan’s na/e under diLLerent Qlasses and built its entire business
on that goodwillZ8185 While these two cases demonstrate the pos-
itive i/paQt oL #rtiQle @’s good Laith prinQiple, /ore worH is still
needed to assure that the cases on the fringes in China are de-
cided in ways that protect the rights of rightful trademark own-
ers.
C. The Need for Continued Improvement
fespite the positive progress that !hina’s EXFD trade/arH
amendments have made toward hindering the trademark squat-
ter problem and showing dedication to the improvement of IP
rights, the law does not fully protect foreign corporations and
individuals.186 Article 7 vaguely articulates a good faith princi-
ple, without establishing any predetermined factors to be ana-
lyzed on a case-by-case basis for what constitutes bad faith reg-
istration of a mark.187 While this may be enough to safeguard
against notorious trademark squatters, as seen in the Michael
Bastian and Michael Jordan cases,188 this broad leniency af-
forded to Chinese courts may result in inconsistent and unpre-
Chinese courts found that Jordan failed to prove that Qiaodan unequivocally
refers to him specifically. See id.
182. SeeWee, supra note 41.
183. See Hsiao & Shen, supra note 180.
184. See id.
185. Michael Jordan’s Trademark Victory in China: A Lesson Learned For
International Companies, ARMSTRONG TEASDALE (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.armstrongteasdale.com/michael-jordans-trademark-victory-in-
china-a-lesson-learned-for-international-companies-12-09-2016/.
186. See Zhou, supra note 102; see also Chang, supra note 45, at 355.
187. See Asbell & Wang, supra note 39; see also Kossof, supra note 1, at 885.
188. See Dresden, supra note 40.
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dictable decisions for less obvious cases of trademark squat-
ting.189 This leniency is especially troublesome, given that dis-
putes against Chinese trademark squatters occur in Chinese
courts,190 giving the trademark squatter a potential advantage
with judges who, for political or governmental reasons, may fa-
vor protection of local trademark rights over foreign challeng-
ers.191 This is evident by the fact that most Chinese courts con-
tinue to favor trademark squatters,192 especially when the for-
eign company or individual is not recognized in China prior to
registration by the trademark squatter.193
Furthermore, even if China provides an adequate definition
detailing what constitutes good faith registration of a trade-
/arH, beQause #rtiQle DB’s appeal proQess Qan only oQQur aLter an
appliQant’s /arH has been registered,194 a barrier is created for
opposing and defeating trademark squatters, as rights are
granted in the mark before a foreign corporation or individual
completes the appeals process.195 This not only weakens the im-
pact and strength of Article 7 for foreign corporations and indi-
viduals196 but also enhances the leverage that a trademark
squatter has over the trademark as ransom until a Chinese
judge makes a final decision regarding the mark.197 This inade-
quate appeals process discourages foreign corporations and in-
dividuals from investing in the application and legal fees associ-
ated with trade/arHs and Qreates sHeptiQis/ in !hina’s ability
to safeguard trademark rights once a trademark squatter has
begun using the mark.198 This concern is validated by the fact
that China has a notoriously low success rate for returning
189. See Asbell & Wang, supra note 39.
190. See generally Sangsuvan, supra note 19, at 291 (explaining that trade-
mark squatting disputes are resolved in Chinese courts because 9the foreign
country is responsible for the enforcement of trademark law within its own
border and will apply its own trademark law to a trademark squatting dis-
pute8).
191. See id. at 292.
192. See Dresden, supra note 40.
193. See Beconcini, supra note 8.
194. PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 35.
195. See Chang, supra note 45, at 353.
196. See New China Trade Mark Law, supra note 165.
197. See Benjamin, supra note 48.
198. See Beconcini, supra note 8.
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trademark rights to legitimate owners once they have been in-
fringed by a squatter.199 Even if foreign corporations and indi-
viduals choose to invest in a Chinese trademark application, un-
der the Qurrent Trade/arH Law, onQe #rtiQle DB’s appeal proQess
is triggered, many foreign corporations and individuals may lack
the resources to challenge trademark squatters, given that in-
validation proceedings may be too expensive and are unlikely to
succeed.200
D. Hispelling the “<ile-<irst” Solution
Despite these legitimate concerns, it has been argued by law-
yers and academics that, rather than amending or repealing
!hina’s Qurrent Trade/arH Law, Loreign Qorporations and indi[
viduals can simply defeat trademark squatters by filing for reg-
istration at an earlier point, even if they have not actually
started conducting business in the registering country.201 While
this is understandably a quick and easy solution, it oversimpli-
fies the magnitude of the problem and is not a viable option for
everyone seeking to register a trademark, as it does not take into
account the varying economic situations amongst individuals
and corporations.202 For example, while the cost of registering a
trademark in China may be insignificant to large corporations,
start-up companies and individuals do not necessarily have the
same financial resources to file a trademark application before
they even decide to enter the Chinese marketplace.203 This
leaves these companies and individuals with the option of receiv-
ing only limited trademark protection, which in turn leaves
them susceptible to trademark squatters.204 Moreover, the first-
to-file solution highlights anticipatory issues in defeating trade-
mark squatters, wherein trademark squatters predict the suc-
Qess that a person will have in the Luture, as seen in Tere/y Lin’s
199. See id.
200. See Fei, supra note 46. Pfizer’s legal batter against Viamen cost millions
of dollars in legal fees. SeeWang & Roberts, supra note 100.
201. See Soon, supra note 49; Fitzpatrick, supra note 49; Baldwin, supra note
49; Trademark Hijacking in China: The Importance of Trademark Registra-
tion, supra note 49.
202. See Brown, supra note 14.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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case.205 Prior to Jeremy Lin gaining notoriety with the New York
Knicks,206 Wuxi Risheng Utility Co., which manufactures sports
equipment, successfully applied for a trademark bearing his
name in China.207 The Jeremy Lin case shows that a trademark
squatter who accurately predicts early success or potential in a
company or individual cannot be stopped by merely implement-
ing the file-first approach,208 as it is not always practical for an
individual to predict that they even have a product or identity to
protect at this early stage.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
fespite the advanQe/ents in !hina’s Trade/arH Law that ad[
dress the trademark squatter problem, further reform is needed
to adequately protect the trademark rights of foreign corpora-
tions and individualsZ Wirst, this Part will argue that #rtiQle @’s
good faith principle needs to be clarified.209 As a guide, China
should looH to #ustralia’s TM## beQause it not only deLines bad
faith but also provides examples of what constitutes bad faith,
eliminating excess discretionary power of Chinese officials. Sec-
ond, #rtiQle DB’s invalidation proQess should be replaQed with
!hina’s EXXF appeals proQess Lor trade/arH disputes, whiQh re[
quired completion of the appeals process before the mark could
become legally registered to either party210 and granted more
rights to foreign corporations and individuals during the appeals
process.
A. Step One: Clarifying the Good Faith Principle
Un Linding solutions to !hina’s vague definition for good faith
trademark registrations, it is beneficial to consider how other
countries have provided a definition for bad faith in their trade-
mark laws.211 While no country has provided a concrete rule for
205. See Benjamin Kang Lim, Trademark Dispute Looming over Who Discov-
ered Jeremy Lin, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2012, 3:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/us-nba-china-trademark-idUSTRE81Q0QC20120227.
206. See New York Knicks, BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/New-York-Knicks (last visited May 26, 2017).
207. Wuxi Risheng Utility Co. only spent 4,460 yuan ($710 USD) to capitalize
on Lin’s estimated net worth of $15 million USD. See Lim, supra note 205.
208. See Cohen, supra note 176.
209. See INTA COMMENTS, supra note 51.
210. See PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 33.
211. See Chang, supra note 45, at 355.
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bad faith, countries have nonetheless been able to provide broad,
generalized guidance for what constitutes a bad faith trademark
application.212
While other countries have provided a definition and guidance
Lor bad Laith registration oL trade/arHs, #ustralia’s approaQh
seems most promising and applicable to the situation in
China.213 The TMAA provides a definition for bad faith applica-
tions that balances the need for flexibility and clarity to protect
foreign corporations and individuals against trademark squat-
ters.214 According to the TMAA, bad faith is broadly defined as
9instanQes in whiQh a person has deliberately set out to gain reg[
istration of a trade mark, or adopted a trade mark in bad
LaithZ8215 Australia then provides specific examples of bad faith
registration of a trademark, including monitoring property de-
velopments and registering a mark associated with it while sim-
ultaneously threatening the legitimate trademark owner with
trademark infringement lawsuits, registering amark with no in-
tent to sell goods associated with the mark in the Australian
marketplace, and engaging in a pattern of slightly altering
trademark names to benefit from the notoriety of the established
mark.216
The positive i/paQt that #ustralia’s bad Laith deLinition Qould
have on !hina’s trade/arH s*uatter proble/ Qan be seen
through Hard Candy Fitness, LLC v. Hardy Candy (Aus-
tralia).217 In this case, an Australian fitness company sought to
register the na/e oL pop singer Madonna’s gy/, Hard !andy, in
212. See HOULIHAN, supra note 165. Brazil, for example, defines bad faith as
attempting to register a trademark that is so similar to an existing trademark
that it is highly unlikely that copying did not occur. See id.
213. See id. See generally Trade Mark Opposition Procedures—Australia,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sct/en/com-
ments/pdf/sct17/au_4.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (discussing the presence
of the good faith principle in Australia’s TMAA and its amended presence in
Australia’s 2006 Trade Mark Act, which allows a third-party to challenge a
trademark registration based on bad faith).
214. See id.
215. Trade Marks Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) s 62A (Austl.); see also
HOULIHAN, supra note 165.
216. See Trade Marks Amendment Act 2006; see also HOULIHAN, supra note
165.
217. Hard Candy Fitness, LLC v. Hard Candy (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015]
ATMO 61 (30 June 2015). See generally Chris Round, Bad-Faith Trademark
Applications, IP L. WATCH, https://www.iplawwatch.com/2016/01/bad-faith-
trademark-applications/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
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Australia.218 Using the examples of bad faith set forth in the
TMAA, the Australian Trademark Office denied the trademark
application, reasoning that the Australian company previously
filed various applications connected to famous foreign compa-
nies, which specifically violated the examples set forth in Aus-
tralia’s trade/arH law by identifying a trademark that had yet
to come to Australia and using it to gain money from the trade-
mark owner.219 This case demonstrates how specific factors can
be used to provide clarity behind the meaning of the good faith
principle in determining whether a trademark squatter is in-
fringing on the rights of others.220 "y adopting #ustralia’s deLi[
nition of bad faith to create more predictability and certainty,
Chinese courts will be guided by examples that are written into
the law when adjudicating trademark disputes.221
B. Step Two: Increase Rights for Challengers
While China can adopt the Australian approach in defining the
bad faith principle, it must also address the issues arising from
Article 35 in order to fully protect foreign corporations and indi-
viduals throughout the entire appeals process.222 !hina’s /ost
optimal solution would be to return to Article 33 of the 2001
amendments, which suspends the grant of a trademark until the
conclusion of opposition proceedings.223 This solution is the
quickest and easiest way to restore an equal appeals process, as
it saves time and resources that would be dedicated to creating
an entirely new appeals process. This may not be a practical or
realistic solution, however, because the adoption of Article 35
was seen as necessary to prevent the backlog of bad faith oppo-
sitions.224 More realistically, rather than replace Article 35 en-
tirely, China could take steps toward correcting the appeals pro-
cess in a way that limits the effect of Article 35 and grants more
rights than are currently afforded to foreign corporations and
218. See Round, supra note 217.
219. The Australian gym previously sought to register trademarks for G-Star
and Isotta Fraschini. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Dresden, supra note 40.
222. See Chang, supra note 45, at 353.
223. See INTA COMMENTS, supra note 51; see also PRC Trademark Law of
2001, supra note 52, art. 33.
224. See Beconcini, supra note 8.
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individuals during the initial opposition process.225 First, in or-
der to limit the effect and need for foreign corporations and in-
dividuals to rely on Article 35, China can place more weight on
a trademark squatter’s response to an alleged violation oL #rtiQle
@’s good Laith re*uire/entZ226 Instead of needing to go through
the invalidation process, which can be time consuming and ex-
pensive, a foreign corporation or individual would be entitled un-
der Article 44 to argue that a failure to respond to an Article 7
violation should be automatic grounds for dismissal of the
mark.227 This solution would align with the purpose of Article
44, which already describes numerous instances where a regis-
tered mark will receive such treatment.228 This solution would
prevent many foreign corporations and individuals who chal-
lenge trade/arH s*uatters Lro/ needing to rely on #rtiQle DB’s
appeals process altogether, as many notorious trademark squat-
ters may fail to reply to the challenges and will forego asserting
any possible rights in the mark for fear that costly litigation will
reveal other illegal squatting schemes.
Moreover, China can both ease the impact of Article 35 and the
bias of Chinese officials against foreign corporations and indi-
viduals that results from trademarking squatting disputes tak-
ing place in China by granting a challenger the right to review
the trade/arH appliQant’s argu/ents and responses to the oppo[
sition, while also allowing the challenger an adequate amount of
time to respond to these documents and the assertions made in
them.229 This will provide more transparency during the initial
opposition proceeding, which may produce more favorable out-
comes for foreign corporations and individuals, thus decreasing
the need for challengers to rely on the invalidation process out-
lined in Article 35.230
CONCLUSION
!hina’s EXFD a/end/ents to its trade/arH law show an eLLort
and willingness to provide more protection than ever previously
afforded to foreign corporations and individuals trying to protect
their trade/arHs in !hinaZ Viven !hina’s powerLul position in
225. See PRC IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS COMMENTS, supra note 53.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See PRC Trademark Law of 2013, supra note 38, art. 44.
229. See PRC IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS COMMENTS, supra note 53.
230. See id.
1024 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2
the global economy and its continued escalation to being the
world’s largest eQono/y with eaQh passing year,231 it is critical
that China amend its trademark law further to consistently de-
ter trademark squatting. After investing time, money, and en-
ergy into making a mark valuable, foreign corporations and in-
dividuals should have adequate legal protections when trying to
reaQh !hinese Qonsu/ers in !hinaZ While #rtiQle @’s good Laith
principle might at first glance appear to combat trademark
squatting, its vagueness empowers Chinese judges to engage in
domestic favoritism and ignore its application to protect trade-
mark squatters. Article 35 is equally troublesome, as after Arti-
cle 7 is ignored, foreign corporations and individuals must resort
to an unequal and ineffective appeals process as a remedy. The
solutions for amending Article 7, which calls for implementing
#ustralia’s LaQtors Lor evaluating Qlai/s oL bad Laith registra[
tion, and Article 35, which calls for limiting its impact by auto-
matically invalidating registrations where the applicant has
failed to respond to an Article 7 violation, and allowing for re-
view of certain documents during the opposition period, will pro-
vide foreign corporations and individuals with clarity, con-
sistency, and increased individual protections when trying to as-
sert trademark rights in China. It is critical that these amend-
ments occur immediately. Until these further amendments are
implemented, potential foreign corporations and individuals will
Qontinue to Leel uneasy investing in !hina’s /arHetplaQe, given
the uncertainty regarding whether they will receive outcomes
similar to Michael Jordan232 andMichael Bastian,233 rather than
those received by Hermès 234 and Pfizer.235
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